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Introduction
In this thesis, I will argue that the most fundamental tendencies that govern 
human nature are compassion and pride, since the former exists inherently and 
undeniably between people and the latter arises inevitably upon the formation of 
communities. I will posit that these tendencies have important implications for the role of 
a legitimate government. Next, I will explain why government is only legitimate insofar 
as it functions to facilitate the political engagement of its citizens. I will then argue that 
political engagement is constituted by the proper manifestation of compassion and 
pride, and it is conditioned by these. Thus, it must be the role of a legitimate 
government to cultivate the right kind of compassion and pride in its citizens. 
I will begin by presenting various accounts of human nature by a few of the most 
foundational political theorists—Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Aristotle. Each provides 
a different justification for the existence of government based on his different views on 
human nature. The three State of Nature theorists explain the formation of society on 
the basis of necessity, while Aristotle believes political association to be fundamental to 
what it means to be human. Of these views on human nature, I argue that Rousseau’s 
is the most convincing because his is the only one that takes compassion to be a 
motivator for human action, while the others believe self-preservation to be man’s only 
intrinsic drive. I will characterize compassion, explain how it conditions self-
preservation, and then show how it is inherent within people. I will then discuss pride, 
the way it develops, and how it can positively manifest itself. The first part of this thesis 
will conclude with the assertion that compassion and pride are fundamental to human 
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nature, and that human nature is not something to be feared and constrained by 
government, but rather something to be cherished and allowed to thrive. 
Next, I will argue that since governments are derived from the will of the people, 
the legitimacy of a government depends on its ability to adequately represent the will of 
its citizens. I maintain that one’s will cannot be delegated or mediated, so the only way 
for a state to achieve this is to encourage the political action of each and every citizen. 
The most effective form of government for enacting this is a direct democracy, which is 
a system that allows citizens to engage directly with the decision-making process and 
therefore stake a personal claim to the state. Then I will present a criticism of direct 
democracy by discussing the trial of Socrates. I will conclude this section of the essay 
by arguing that a government that does not reflect the nature and will of its citizens is 
illegitimate.
 Throughout this piece, I will assert the importance of pride and compassion in 
political activity. The former drives political engagement because people generally work 
and care for things that they feel pride in. The latter directs this political engagement 
toward the proper ends. It encourages people to think of one another, not just 
themselves, when making decisions and it also tempers some of the destructive 
potential of pride. This leads me to make the claim that a properly developed sense of 
pride for ones state and a keen sense of compassion for others form the basis for 
meaningful political action. 
In short, the legitimacy of a state depends on its ability to reflect the will and 
nature of its citizens. The only way for a state to reflect the will and nature of its citizens 
is through widespread political engagement. Since political engagement is conditioned 
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by pride and compassion, I conclude that it must be the role of a legitimate government 
to encourage and cultivate these two fundamental aspects of human nature. 
Part One
Section A: The Makings of a Legitimate State
To determine what the role of a legitimate government is, and what 
responsibilities it has to its people, one must first examine how that government came to 
be and where it receives its legitimacy. To understand the roots of government is to 
glimpse at the intended relationship between the citizen and the state, for it is from 
within the citizens, the common people, that a just government arises. Beginning as 
early as antiquity, political theorists have sought to justify the authority of government 
within society and to explain how it came to be. Most tend to believe that the 
development of government occurred simultaneously and inevitably with the combining 
of people into communities. To some, such as Aristotle, to form political associations is 
to embrace an essential aspect of human nature, which is communally oriented. To 
others, like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, societies and their governments exist to 
provide a higher standard of living for their people, and to encourage or facilitate 
harmony. Both schools of thought lend themselves to the belief that that government, 
which will be referred to here as the state, is both aimed at some good and derives its 
legitimacy from its constituents. After all, no one would voluntarily consent to a condition 
somehow worse than their previously existing one. 
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I would posit that insofar as the state is the culmination of the wills of its citizens, 
it should have no authority beyond these. Furthermore, the only legitimate form of 
government is the one which directly and precisely embodies the natures and desires of 
its citizens. The political engagement of citizens is key to achieving such a government. 
Their wills cannot be delegated to others, but rather each citizen must stake his own 
claim to the political life of the state if there is to be any hope of adequate 
representation. Delegation, as it occurs within a republic or any other representative 
government, strips the citizen of his most essential right and negates the very purpose 
of his citizenship: the right to have his will heard and then reflected within his state. The 
only adequate representation is self-representation. The only legitimate government 
must therefore be a direct democracy because this is the only government in which the 
people are free to engage in politics without constraint of any kind, and in which their 
prideful and compassionate nature is harnessed and allowed to thrive. 
Section B: The State of Nature Theorists (and Aristotle)
Thomas Hobbes was the first to address the issue of government legitimacy by 
discussing it in terms of its inception. What made people found societies, and more 
importantly, what made people decide to form governments to lead them? In his 
Leviathan, he created a theoretical world called the ‘State of Nature’ in which humans 
existed prior to any notion of government. This is a state of absolute freedom, in which 
mankind is free to act in whichever way he chooses. Hobbes believes that given this 
freedom, people are inclined to act solely out of self-preservation and embrace their 
most basic instincts, which he believes to be violent and distrustful. His State of Nature 
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is one of “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short.”  The Hobbesian depiction of man in his most natural state is 1
that of a savage, self-interested beast; unintelligent and governed by fear. This depiction 
is paired with a conception of man as an animalistic slave to Nature; he acts in 
accordance with his instincts and every one of his actions is aimed at his survival. In this 
state, mankind is pitted against itself in a perpetual battle for supremacy. To Hobbes, 
societies originate as a way of achieving peace in what would otherwise be a world 
plagued by constant violence and anxiety. 
Central to Hobbes’ conceptualization of man within the State of Nature is that he 
has no idea of a summum bonum, or the “highest good”. This is because any notions of 
good or evil amount to nothing more than an individual’s appetites or desires, or his 
natural tendencies to move toward or away from certain things. If one were to come up 
with a summum bonum, his would undoubtably be at odds with someone else’s, since 
different people desire different things at different times. While there can be no shared 
summum bonum, there can be a shared summum malum, or “greatest evil”. This is the 
“Feare of death” , which every person experiences in common within the State of 2
Nature. This fear, along with reason, leads mankind out of the despicable conditions of 
Nature and into the less anxious conditions of society, wherein their freedoms are 
curtailed by an unquestioned and unchangeable authority. It would appear that Hobbes 
considers the relinquishment of ones liberty, and even his free will, to be justified in the 
interest of escaping Nature and obtaining peace.  
 Hobbes, Thomas, Richard Tuck, Raymond Geuss, and Quentin Skinner. Hobbes: "Leviathan" 1
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print. 89.
 Hobbes. 90.2
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John Locke, who wrote a century later than Hobbes, was also involved in 
explaining the legitimacy of government, and society on a whole, through his own 
conception of the State of Nature. Similarly to Hobbes, Locke believed that within this 
state of absolute freedom there would be constant conflict between people over 
resources and survival. But this state is not all bad to him. This is because in this state 
each individual can experience true liberty in a way that he cannot within society. Locke 
considers this liberty fundamental to human nature and he cherishes this aspect of the 
State of Nature. In his Second Treatise of Government he writes:
In the state of nature, liberty consists of being free from any 
superior power on Earth. People are not under the will or 
lawmaking authority of others but have only the law of nature for 
their rule.3
It is only within the State of Nature that one can be free of any and all forces of coercion 
or dominance. He need not submit to anyone’s will but his own, and he is free to pursue 
his own interests with minimal hindrance. The “law of nature” is the right to protect 
oneself and his extensions, which for Locke meant his property. As competition between 
people inevitably brings rise to conflict, it was in the best interest of people to remain 
solitary in the State of Nature. Where Locke departs from the Hobbesian theory most 
sharply is in his focus on individual property. That man has no reasonable way to protect 
his property within the State of Nature other than violence necessitates that a civil 
society be formed in order to handle these disputes in a non-violent fashion. Society 
 Locke, John. Two Treatises on Government: a translation into modern English. Manchester: Industrial 3
Systems Research, 2009. 117.
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therefore represents an agreement between free agents to protect the liberties of the 
individual, which contrasts significantly with the Hobbesian view. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was interested in dealing with similar issues, and he 
believed that the Hobbesian depiction of the savage man was inaccurate, or at least 
incomplete. In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau examines human nature in its 
most primitive form in an attempt to trace the roots of inequality among men. He strips 
man down to his most basic form, “such as he must have issued from the hands of 
Nature” and asserts that despite being less agile or physically powerful than other 
animals, mankind is “the most advantageously organized of all.”  Rousseau proposes 4
that the “savage man” (that is, someone living outside of society) is not ruled merely by 
self-preservation, but also by an inherent sense of compassion that occurs between 
sentient beings, which he calls pitié. The virtue of pity serves to lessen man’s natural 
fervency for egocentrism and causes him to feel compassion for others despite his 
tendency to act out of self-interest. This leads Rousseau to argue that the eventual 
formation of societies (and subsequently, of governments) is in the interest of both pity 
and self-preservation, as it would be difficult to imagine communities existing without 
them. Contrary to Hobbes (and Locke, to a point), Rousseau does not envision an 
inherently violent or anxious State of Nature. His is one of relative peace, and to him 
societies are formed not to escape nature but to improve peoples’ lives and enable them 
to accomplish more than they could have individually. 
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and Donald A. Cress. Basic Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. 4
Print. 47.
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Aristotle takes a quite different different approach from the State of Nature 
theorists in justifying the formation of the state in his Politics. Instead of merely being 
conditioned by self-preservation, Aristotle conceptualizes that political associations are 
formed because it is human nature to engage in politics. Aristotle begins by stating that 
all human endeavors are aimed at “some good” and that therefore the formation of a 
political association must also be aimed at “some good.” From this, he rationalizes that 
the political institution aimed at the highest good, which also encompasses many 
smaller goods, should be said to have the highest authority. This institution for him is the 
Greek polis (and for us, the state), which is the natural culmination of its parts. In an 
attempt to attain a higher quality of living, human beings have formed various 
associations, beginning with the household, and then the village, and then ultimately the 
state, or nation. Aristotle concludes that man is “by nature a political animal”  insofar as 5
he is naturally inclined to form political units. If one were to live outside of the state, or 
polis, he would be denying his nature and reducing himself to something less than an 
animal, which is naturally at home in the wild. It is only as part of the polis that man can 
achieve his highest ends.
Each of the above thinkers has a different understanding of what it means to be a 
human being, and this leads each to a different conclusion about what a society ought 
to look like. The Hobbesian perspective, which views man in a quite negative light, 
lends itself to absolutism in an effort to control and constrain its citizens; to get them to 
act not according to their nature but in a more manageable and civilized fashion. Life in 
Hobbes’ State of Nature is a hellish chaos, and a strong controlling hand is necessary in 
 Aristotle, and C. D. C. Reeve. Politics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1998. Print. 1253a1-5.5
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order to keep the peace. Locke’s understanding of human nature bears many 
similarities to Hobbes’ but he has a quite different perspective on it. He views the 
inherently dangerous conditions of the State of Nature as having a great deal of value in 
the way they allow for individualism and freedom, but he still considers it to be unideal. 
Aristotle’s view of nature, although he doesn’t address it as explicitly as Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, is also somewhat pessimistic. To him, human beings are essentially 
insignificant when taken individually and their lives lack meaning or importance when 
separated from their communities. The state is what teaches virtue and civility, and men 
separated from their state are no better than animals, or worse—barbarians. This leads 
Aristotle to suggest that any form of government is preferable to none at all, presumably 
even if its citizens are miserable.
Rousseau’s conception of human nature is less negative: he sees mankind as 
relatively well off prior to the creation of the state, and thus his state aims to mirror in 
many ways the conditions of nature. Rousseau claims that in Nature man is subject only 
to his instincts, guided by the inherent principles of self-preservation and pity. The 
“savage man” has few needs in this state and no conception of good or evil. In response 
to Hobbes’ assertion that a life in the State of Nature is miserable, Rousseau asks, 
“What kind of misery can there be for a free being whose heart is at peace and whose 
body is in good health?” After all, the burdens of the soul do not weigh on the savage 
man as they do on the civil man. The civil man is more complex but also more 
vulnerable, while the savage man must “think only of food, rest, and sex.”  It is a 6
primitive state, but a happy one.
 Rousseau. 60, 47.6
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Section C: Compassion
Having discussed three different justifications for the existence of government, let 
us try to explain the intended relationship between citizen and state. I have already 
mentioned that a citizen’s political action is conditioned by two fundamental aspects of 
his nature—compassion and pride—and that these two aspects of his nature must be 
taken into account if a legitimate government is to function properly. Here I will discuss 
the former. 
Rousseau’s idea of self-preservation is relatively unusual. While he concurs with 
most other thinkers of natural law in emphasizing every animal’s natural duty to 
perpetuate its life, Rousseau couples this right with a deeply engrained desire to not 
cause others pain. He calls this characteristic pity, or compassion, and explains that it 
helps to counter man’s self-preservational instincts:
[Pity], having been given to man in order to mitigate, in certain 
circumstances, the ferocity of his egocentrism, or the desire for self-
preservation before this egocentrism of his came into being, 
tempers the ardor he has for his own well-being by an innate 
repugnance to seeing his fellow men suffer.  7
Self-preservation is among man’s strongest instincts and dictates nearly every one of 
his actions, but only the most desperate circumstances can drive him to harm another 
human being. Rousseau suggests the maxim: “Do what is good for you with as little 
harm as possible to others.”  In other words, one should not necessarily disregard the 8
well-being of his peers in the interest of self-preservation. This feeling of pity, or 
compassion, is one of mankind’s most basic and pragmatic instincts. 
 Rousseau. 62. 7
 Rousseau. 64.8
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From as early as infancy, a baby will cry upon witnessing the displeasure of 
another, signifying an inherent sense of compassion between people. This tendency 
continues to develop over the course of a lifetime, becoming stronger and more 
complex, and extending beyond one’s immediate peers. While an infant’s sense of 
compassion may be limited to his caregivers and later to his family and friends, by late 
adolescence most people have already developed a keen sense of empathy. This 
empathy not only enables, but necessitates people to put themselves in the shoes of 
another when considering how their actions will affect those around them. A century of 
psychological research indicates that by the time young men and women reach 
adulthood, they are capable of not just interpreting other’s emotional and physiological 
states, but also intuitively predicting them. This sense allows people to experience, 
viscerally or emotionally, the feelings or thoughts of another. The phenomenon being 
described here is often referred to as “feeling for” someone else, and it is one that every 
normally functioning and psychologically stable individual has experienced firsthand.  9
This tendency, while emotionally charged, is not grounded in subjective emotion, but 
rather in biological instinct. Humans must have compassion because without it the 
species would be on a drastically different trajectory, one without complex civilization, 
which would be impossible without an incredible propensity for cooperation. It is man’s 
natural distaste for pain and his instinctual drive to protect his species that inclines him 
toward pity. At this point, it may be beneficial to consider pity as an extension of man’s 
 Eisenberg, Nancy, and Janet Strayer. Empathy and Its Development. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987. 9
Print. 5-6. 
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self-preservational instincts that servers to temper or direct it, as oppose to simply 
countering it. 
Due to man’s “repugnance” at witnessing the hardship of his peers, he is made to 
act morally when interacting with others. Even when acting out of self-interest, the 
savage man rarely seeks to take advantage of others because he has nothing to gain 
by doing so with no conception of property or value beyond survival in the State of 
Nature. Instead, he chooses to help others, often at his own expense. An act of pity can 
even serve to undermine one’s self-preservation. For example, while saving someone’s 
life is an act of compassion, it also perpetuates the competition for important resources 
like food. Nonetheless, pity constantly drives man to act with apparent disregard for self-
interest. Rousseau writes:
Pity is what carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see 
suffering. Pity is what, in the state of nature, takes the place of 
laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is tempted 
to disobey its sweet voice.  10
This understanding of common interest or support serves the same purpose as a set of 
laws or virtues because it protects each individual and any of his or her extensions, i.e., 
one’s property and loved ones. If one feels pity and sympathy for another, he is less 
inclined to harm him. Compassion discourages violence and encourages co-existence 
and natural equality, as laws attempt to do. Rousseau’s take on “natural law” differs 
significantly from Locke’s, which entails merely the right to protect oneself and results in 
conflict, not peace. The “advantage” that Rousseau mentions is that since these natural 
 Rousseau. 64.10
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laws exist inherently in mankind, there is no controlling authority or coercing party to 
oppose. It would seem, then, that a state in which man is most free to act in accordance 
with his nature is both happier and contains less social unrest. If the laws were merely a 
reflection of man’s own natural tendencies, where would he be tempted to disobey?
Section E: Pride
Having addressed compassion, it is important to discuss the other essential 
aspect of human nature—pride—and where it originates. In order to survive, the savage 
man needed to learn to protect himself and hunt. Rousseau writes, “his superiority over 
the other animals ...produced within him the first stirrings of pride; ...he laid claim to it in 
virtue of his individuality.”  Man began to consider himself dominant among species, 11
which led to the development of pride. Although the savage man had previously 
preferred to remain solitary, he started comparing himself to others and finding that they 
had much in common. This enabled him to either work with others or continue to live 
alone; all this without the development of a spoken language. When man discovered 
certain tasks were more plausible with the help of others, his inclination switched to 
community-based living, since he no longer would need to preform every task himself. 
Societies grew in size, starting with small families and ending eventually in entire 
nations. 
 Rousseau. 70.11
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The pride that developed from man’s self-awareness is not just an individual 
pride, or pride in oneself, but also a pride that extends beyond the self to include ones 
peers. Mankind’s dominance over other species serves to unite it, and it seems at times 
that anything can be accomplished with cooperation. While nearly every species 
cooperates, some even more than humans, what these other species lack is intellect 
and morality, which are unique to humans. It is with these unique elements of humanity 
that one learns to feel pride for the right things and experience it at the proper moments. 
While pride is often negatively construed as egocentrism, there are several positive 
forms of pride that an individual can experience. Pride in ones community, for example, 
is a quite positive feeling to have, as is pride in ones work. Unlike individual pride, these 
other forms of pride are not grounded in an inflated self image, but rather in the 
knowledge that one has worked to create something good, like how athletes feel pride 
in the success of their team. With a sufficient intellect and a proper ethical background, 
one can appreciate the value of experiencing pride in certain instances.
Aristotle believed that a proper moral education was crucial to the flourishing of a 
society. Since the state is defined by its citizens, a good state must be made up of good 
citizens, and a good state would also produce good citizens. Part of being a virtuous 
citizen is learning how to properly experience certain feelings, like pleasure and pain, or 
joy and sadness. One of the concepts that is fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is that of 
the “Golden Mean”, which implies maintaining a balance between two extremes of ones 
character, one being excess and the other being deficiency.  It is in the balance of 12
 Aristotle, and Richard McKeon. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 2009. Print. 12
1106a26-b28.
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these extremes that true virtue belongs. For example, courage is the Mean between 
recklessness and cowardice. Someone who is courageous is able to assess certain 
dangers and recognize that some are worth facing and others are not, and the amount 
of fear he experiences is appropriate to the situation. A coward would be overcome by 
fear, and a reckless person would have no fear at all. Aristotle suggests that the same 
scheme applies to each of the virtues. Virtue, then, is an intermediate condition that 
must be experienced in moderation.
Pride is considered a virtue by Aristotle, and it exists in the mean between vanity 
and timidness. He describes it thus: “Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks 
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them; for he who does so beyond his 
deserts is a fool”.  One who considers himself to be worthy of greatness, or capable of 13
great things, but is in fact neither, is vain.The vain person is delusional and has an 
inflated self image; his opinion of himself is not reflected in his actions and he wrongly 
attributes certain virtues to himself. On the other hand, one who considers himself to be 
unworthy of greatness, or fails to recognize his greatness is timid, or “unduly humble”. 
The timid person is also unable to perceive himself accurately, though in a way opposite 
to the vain person. One who is proud, though, is both worthy of great things and knows 
himself to be so. He is able to see himself for what he is, and to meaningfully judge his 
own worth. One who is proud should also be recognized by his peers for being great, 
since his opinion of himself must  correspond with others’ opinions of him, because 
greatness is not a subjective condition to Aristotle. 
 Aristotle, McKeon. 1125a15-20.13
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In addition to feeling pride in the proper ways, one must also feel pride at the 
proper moments, and for the proper things. The proud person does not feel pride in 
regards to “small matters”, but rather his focus is on greater things. The greatest 
endeavor from the Aristotelian perspective is the political life, or the engagement of a 
citizen with his state. In his Nicomachean Ethics he describes politics as “the most 
authoritative” and “the master art”.  The highest end that one can pursue is a life of 14
politics, which is a life dedicated to the betterment of one’s community. Since it is human 
nature to form political communities, then one’s humanity is inherently tied to the state, 
and it is his responsibility to improve it. 
Aristotle’s 5th century Athens was governed by direct democracy, a system in 
which every citizen has equal say in all the decision-making of the polis. Citizens were 
invited each week to attend the public assembly where they would vote, by show of 
hands, on policies proposed by their fellow Athenians. These meetings generally took 
place in the agora, or the central marketplace of the city, which was the heart of the 
city’s public life. While those most eloquent and persuasive were often admired as 
leaders within the assembly, there was no official transference of authority to others in 
the form of delegates or electors. This direct democracy differs considerably from 
American representative government in that a sense of personal responsibility for the 
success (or failure) of the polis was deeply embedded within its citizens. 
As adolescents, all Greeks were required to undergo military training and serve 
in their city-state’s army. In Athens, these young men were called ephebos, and they 
 Aristotle, McKeon. 1094b.14
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were instructed in fighting, physical fitness, and academics (referred to as ephebic 
training) before fulfilling two years of mandatory military service at the age of eighteen. 
Similar to a school class or team, the ephebes would enjoy a wide range of activities 
aimed at fraternization and camaraderie, such as playing sports or putting on organized 
performances for the viewing pleasure of the polis. Once they had graduated from their 
ephebic status and become men in the eyes of the state, each was officially granted 
citizenship. Every citizen was expected (but not legally obligated) to take part in the 
political life of the city by serving terms in public office and attending judicial or 
deliberative assemblies, where individuals were free to express their own beliefs and 
opinions. Citizens lived together, fought together, enjoyed leisure together, and 
governed together. As a result, they shared a unique and proud bond. 
So strong was this bond that to be exiled from the polis was considered a fate far 
worse than death. One could be banished from the city for life, or one could be exiled 
for a period of ten years, which was called ostracism. Once a year the assembly would 
meet in the agora to discuss potential ostracisms; each citizen would write the names of 
those they wanted to be exiled and place them into an urn to be counted. If, according 
to Plutarch, one name received at least six-thousand votes, that citizen would have his 
case debated two months later. A maximum of one citizen could be exiled each year. 
Ostracism was used employed most often as a preemptive measure against a 
perceived tyrant or some other treat to the Athenian democracy. While the great and 
controversial political leader Pericles was not ostracized himself, he was at multiple 
times a candidate. One of his prominent rivals, Thucydides (not the historian), was 
ostracized and removed from Athens when his beliefs were deemed to be subversive. 
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In the 6th century B.C., Peisistratos was permanently banished for attempting to claim 
power in Athens. While in exile, he amassed an army of mercenaries and returned to 
the city to take it by force. One could also be forced into exile without a formal trial, such 
as in the case of the tyrant Alcibiades, who first fled to Sparta and then to Persia, after 
being involved in a brutal takeover of Athens, during which the city-state became an 
oligarchy instead of a democracy. 
In the words of the orator Antiphon, to be exiled was to become “a beggar in a 
strange land, an old man without a city.”  One’s life was so intertwined with his peers 15
and with the city that to be forced out of it would have been unthinkable to most. 
Aristotle argued that since the polis and the individual citizen each ultimately desired 
happiness, their aims were inseparable. As a result, the concept of opposition between 
the laws of the state and the rights or freedoms of its citizens did not exist in ancient 
Athens. They were considered to be one and the same. This would lead Aristotle to 
posit, famously, that man is “by nature a political animal”, in that man’s sense of 
personhood was deeply reliant on political association. He went as far as to assert that 
man fails to fulfill his ultimate purpose when disconnected from the polis; he is not 
“human” in the truest sense of the word. Aristotle, in his extreme communitarianism, 
argued that life has no value outside the boundaries of the state. His predecessor, 
Socrates, refused to leave Athens even through periods of intense violence and political 
scrutiny, despite many accounts indicating that he would have been welcomed by nearly 
any city. Instead he was reserved to die, rather than flee from his city.
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The pride that the Athenians felt for their community is unmatched, and it 
represents the ideal relationship between citizen and state. This sense of pride is 
absolutely essential to the proper functioning of any political community, and it grows 
from the involvement of each individual. If someone feels a deep connection with 
something, he is likely to do his best to sustain and improve it, especially if it is 
something he himself created. In an ideal and legitimate state, every citizen has a hand 
in its functioning and its progression. In this way, the political trajectory of the state 
aligns with the spirit of its citizens, and constantly evolves along with their views. People 
are always evolving, and it should always be the goal of a legitimate state to evolve with 
them. 
Section E: Pride, Compassion, Gardens
If pride is the force that motivates political action, then compassion is what 
directs it. Empathy exists inherently between people, but this empathy rarely applies 
beyond ones immediate relationships. A small child may care for his parents or his 
siblings, but he is not yet able to extend this same sense of empathy to those not 
closest to him. By adolescence he most likely cares about many more people than he 
did as a child, such that he is beginning to be able to imagine himself in another’s 
shoes, but still his perspective and compassion are limited to his own private world. It is 
only in adulthood that one’s sphere of empathy can plausibly extend so far as to include 
the interests of people across the country, or half way around the world, and even then 
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it is still an imperfect compassion. Compassion, like pride, is a virtue that must be 
cultivated if it is to properly condition political action. 
A properly developed sense of compassion is rooted in the understanding that 
people are interconnected and the desire to not cause harm to others. The truly 
compassionate political actor does not seek to take advantage of others for personal 
gain, but rather he sees their interests as the same. His sense of pride is tightly 
interwoven with his sense of compassion, as the latter forces the former outward, 
despite its tendency to face inward. It is what causes him to feel pride in the success of 
the state, because each of his peers is seen as an extension of himself and his own 
identity. The compassionately prideful man is one doesn’t judge his worth by 
comparison to his fellow citizens, but by the effects his actions have on his fellow 
citizens. Compassion, when applied to the political sphere, is what guides people 
toward right action and allows for a sense of national pride that is grounded in the 
success of the state, and never in xenophobia.
The conceptual moment when mankind leaves the state of nature in favor of 
society is crucial in understanding the legitimacy of government. Hobbes, Rousseau, 
and other social contract theorists share in common the belief that people enter into 
society with the goal in mind to protect themselves and live better. After all, no one 
would consent to something that somehow reduced their standard of living. Where 
these theorists differ is in their view of human nature and the degree to which the state 
is obligated to constrain it. Hobbes’ state of nature is brutal, anxious, and unsafe. He 
describes it as bellum omnium contra omnes, or “the war of all against all”, in his 
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Leviathan. His view of the savage man is the most primitive of the state of nature 
theorists, and he saw men as naturally and violently opposed to one another in their 
fierce competition for resources and survival. Because of this negative view of human 
nature, he asserted that the best government (an absolute monarch in his case) must 
be one that counters man’s innate tendencies and forces him into submission. Hobbes 
is not concerned as much with bringing people together, as he believes that it is not in 
their nature to coexist: “men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of 
griefe) in keeping company.”  Thus his envisioned state is one in which people are held 16
or forced together. It is not one built upon human nature, but one built in opposition to it. 
The state of nature is a despicable state; one that must be escaped by any means 
necessary. 
What separates Rousseau’s social and political theory from Hobbes’ is that the 
former views humans in a more positive light. To Rousseau, the state of nature is not 
something to be feared, but rather something to be revered. The savage man is much 
more psychologically complex than Hobbes would have us believe. The savage man is 
concerned with extending his life, but not necessarily at the expense of others. He is 
completely content, or even happy, in his limited existence because he has everything 
he needs to survive and no knowledge of anything more. Even more significant is the 
fact that the savage man has complete freedom, which is something that has not 
existed since the advent of society. Whereas Hobbes is fearful of this freedom, because 
he thinks men would use this freedom to harm one another, Rousseau embraces it 
because he believes they will choose to coexist in relative peace. This view leads 
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Rousseau to advocate a form of government not aimed at constraining its citizens, but 
instead at providing them with as many “natural” rights as possible and encouraging 
cooperation. Any laws preventing citizens from doing harm to one another could be 
justified on the basis that they protect and encourage human nature. 
Additionally, they hold different views regarding the natural and legal rights of 
people, some appearing unalienable and other appearing quite alienable. It is clear that 
man must give up certain freedoms in order to enjoy a higher standard of living, but the 
key is finding which freedoms he is capable of giving up while still feeling free. This 
feeling of freedom is absolutely crucial to an optimally functioning society. In order to 
experience a well-founded pride in ones state, he must feel a sense of connection to it 
that can only be built by means of political engagement. Just as an artist experiences 
pride in creating a work of art, or a worker in a job well done, so too does a citizen’s 
pride in his state follow from his personal stake in it. It is his feeling of freedom, though, 
that enables him to interact genuinely and without constraint with his state. If the state 
were to  impose itself on its citizens in a way that made them feel imposed on, they 
would begin feeling resentment toward it, not pride. Ones feeling of nationalism and 
political pride must be rooted in the belief that he affected it and that he chose freely to 
feel this way.
In his book Utopia, Thomas More aims to create a perfect “utopian” society 
based on his own ideology. Among some of the strange and unique religious, economic, 
and political customs he describes, More emphasizes the intense connection his 
Utopians have with one another and with the state. His is a society without personal 
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property, so each family takes turns living in different houses, all of which are built 
almost identically with a large garden space out front. More is fascinated with the way in 
which the Utopians interact with these temporary, communal spaces. He pays particular 
attention to the gardens of these houses, which the Utopians maintain with the utmost 
care:
They cultivate their gardens with great care, so that they have both 
vines, fruits, herbs, and flowers in them; and all is so well ordered, 
and so finely kept, that I never saw gardens anywhere that were 
both so fruitful and so beautiful as theirs. And this humour of 
ordering their gardens so well, is not only kept up by the pleasure 
they find in it, but also by an emulation between the inhabitants of 
the several streets, who vie with each other; and there is indeed 
nothing belonging to the whole town that is both more useful and 
more pleasant.17
More’s preoccupation with these gardens in both strange and striking upon first 
encounter with the text, but it is apparent that they represent something far more 
significant to him than the outdoor recreation they entail and the beautification they 
provide. The Utopian garden is a symbol of the state as a whole, and the care that 
citizens put into maintaining their gardens is reflective of their relationship with their 
state. Though it is not spelled out neatly for the reader, More characterizes his Utopians’ 
sense of citizenship through not just their civic engagement, but also their seemingly 
insignificant interests and pastimes. 
Although several aspects of More’s Utopian society are too foreign to seriously 
entertain, his discussion of gardens represents well the ideal connection between 
citizen and state. The garden is the medium through which Utopians can express their 
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Cambridge UP, 2002. Print. 31-32.
 Cree  24
love for their community. These gardens are not theirs to keep, but still they feel intense 
satisfaction in working to make it better. Each group of Utopians that rotates through 
any given house contributes to the flourishing of that house’s garden, making it more 
fruitful and beautiful for the family that moves in next. In a short period of time the entire 
city is filled with lush gardens, which everyone agrees is both pleasant and practical. 
What is most remarkable about this practice is that these Utopians are driven not by 
selfishness or ego, but by a desire to contribute to something greater than what any one 
individual can achieve. They are not forced by the state to maintain their gardens but 
rather chose to do so freely. Outside of his viewing pleasure, the individual does not 
clearly gain anything for himself by gardening. But his actions, and the simultaneous 
actions of his peers, are what make Utopia such a nice place to live. It is a society 
comprised of people who believe in making it as good as it can be and feel pride in 
doing so. 
In an ideal state, each person should strive to make his state better and this is 
done through political action. Imagine that the political sphere is one large Utopian 
garden with every citizen engaged in making it flourish. This engagement is not just 
essential in making the state as good as it can possibly be, but it also cultivates a sense 
of pride for the state that can only grow from having a personal stake in it. This personal 
stake is the basis for a healthy national pride, which derives not from fear or dislike of 
others but from communal accomplishment. Once this pride is built, it will continue to 
encourage political action.
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Part Two
Section A: The State as a Fluid Amalgamation of Wills
Since the state has no legitimacy beyond that which it is given by its citizens, 
who consent (whether explicitly or implicitly) to live within it instead of within the state of 
nature, it must find harmony between both their intrinsic nature and their desires. It must 
be not an absolute authority but rather a true consensus of its people. A direct 
democracy is best because it is capable of most truly reflecting the will of its citizens 
through their direct contribution and because it empowers each man to, more or less, be 
the master of his own fate. In fact, I would posit that any other form of government is 
illegitimate in that each fails to adequately embody the spirit of its people and to foster 
compassion and pride within them. 
As has been stated previously, ones will cannot be delegated, and the only 
adequate representation is self-representation. A government that fails to engage its 
citizens cannot be considered legitimate, since it was formed on the basis of their 
political cooperation, and no person would willingly relinquish their authority or consent 
to be governed by their peer. The Hobbesian monarchy alienates the individual from the 
state, and ultimately from his peers. It also counters mankind’s natural tendencies, 
fostering resentment and eventually building dissent, which leads to social unrest and 
violence. Rousseau’s government brings people together. And since it is built upon our 
natural values and inclinations, there is much less resentment. Widespread public 
involvement is important in fostering a sense of freedom, interconnection, and national 
pride. These things are inherently lacking in authoritarian governments.
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Government is nothing more than an amalgamation of its peoples’ wills, and it is 
through them that it originates. A government should at no point have a will, identity, or 
purpose of its own. These are continuously created for it by its citizens through political 
engagement. The sole purpose of government should be to facilitate the political activity 
of its citizens and it should have no inherent responsibility beyond this. The only 
legitimate form of government must therefore be the one that most directly embodies 
the wills and natures of its citizens. In any legitimate state, there is little or no distinction 
between the citizens and the state, and the state is perceived merely as an extension of 
its people, evolving constantly with them and at no point constraining or controlling 
them.
Section B - Tyranny of the Majority 
A rational criticism of direct democracy, and indeed any form of democracy, 
would be that it allows for ‘tyranny of the majority’, a term coined by John Adams in the 
late 18th century. This is a condition in which the majority population places its own 
interests above those of the various minority populations within a state. The interest of 
the majority can often be at the expense of the minority, causing the latter to feel 
imposed on. The oppression experienced by the minority is comparable to that 
experienced under a tyrant or autocrat. Indeed it is the nature of democracies to form a 
consensus, or general will, that sees some suffer while most flourish. 
This phenomena is represented by the famous trial of Socrates in 399 B.C., 
which brought an end to one of the most intellectually enlightened eras in history. The 
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event continues to baffle philosophers and historians today. Why, in a society praised for 
its freedom and intellectuality, would a jury of five hundred Athenians sentence to death 
a man who has been described as the ‘wisest man in Greece’ just years before he 
would have met his natural end?  The fact that Socrates taught in Athens for his entire 18
adult life with minimal hinderance serves to further complicate this question. What could 
he have said or done to warrant the steep charges laid against him? While it is 
impossible to truly determine the rationale behind such a verdict, an analysis of the 
relevant sources indicates that Socrates was perceived as a threat to the Athenian 
democracy and the traditional institutions of the city.
Despite his fame and the unparalleled influence he has had on the development 
of philosophy, little is actually known of the character of Socrates. Since he never wrote 
down his ideas or kept written records, all information regarding the man himself can be 
found in various subjective accounts by his contemporaries. Born in 470 B.C., as a 
young man Socrates witnessed the rise to power of Pericles and the dawn of a new era 
of prosperity and freedom that followed. Pericles (who may well have been the first 
liberal politician in Western history) believed that everyone deserved liberty, not just 
wealthy property owners. His allocation of Athenian resources to the arts, courts, and 
public welfare initiatives resulted in a significant power shift from the once all-powerful 
aristocrats to the masses.
Yet despite having come of age in the bastion of democracy and liberalism that 
was fifth-century Athens, Socrates developed a curious set of ideals that would separate 
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him from most of his fellow Athenians and ultimately serve as the basis for some of the 
charges against him. Socrates was neither a democrat nor did he believe in a sense of 
inherent equality among men. In fact, he posited that the masses were not fit for self-
governance, but rather they should be guided by those most wise and suited for 
leadership. Furthermore, he asserted that the common man was not capable of 
cultivating the virtue and intellect necessary for a state to flourish, and he even 
protested the right of such citizens to participate in politics and speak in public 
assemblies. Socrates’ unpopular opinions quickly became known, as the majority of his 
discussions would take place in the streets of Athens. In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates 
criticizes Pericles for causing Athenians to become “idle, cowardly, talkative and 
avaricious.”  According to the third century biographer Diogenes Laertius, who wrote a 19
series of brief histories on many prominent figures, Socrates developed a reputation as 
an eccentric instigator who often voiced his beliefs with condescension and contempt, 
making his listeners angry and even provoking some to violence. Laertius writes of 
Socrates, “frequently, owing to his vehemence in argument, men set upon him with their 
fists or tore his hair out; and for the most part he was despised and laughed at, yet bore 
all this ill-usage patiently.”  However controversial his teachings may have been, 20
Socrates was probably not perceived as much of a threat to Athens until later in his life. 
Or perhaps he was simply testing the tolerance of his peers, until they reached breaking 
point at the time of the trial. Nevertheless, he was allowed to continue his philosophizing 
throughout his entire adult life without significant interference.
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Socrates’ reputation suffered significantly around the turn of the fourth century 
when the democracy was temporarily overthrown twice by two of Socrates’ closest 
friends and pupils; Alcibiades in 411 B.C. and Critias about six years later. The 
teachings of Socrates began to be seen as subversive, as the two violent revolutions 
led by the pro-aristocratic Alcibiades and Critias reflected his distaste for the current 
Athenian government and his oligarchic leanings. Socrates was even said to have 
admired Sparta (the primary rival of Athens) for its oligarchy, which is expressed in 
Aristophanes’ Birds, when he is described as the idol of the pro-Spartan dissenters in 
Athens.  During these two brief periods of oligarchy, Athens witnessed incredible 21
violence and many of the prominent members of the democracy were either killed or 
exiled from Athens, including Anytus, who would later be one of the leading prosecutors 
of Socrates. Critias belonged to a notorious group of oligarchs called the Thirty Tyrants, 
who would wreak further destruction and injustice upon the people of Athens, and who 
propounded many of the same ideals as Socrates. While it is unclear as to what 
Socrates’ relationship was with the Thirty Tyrants, he said and did nothing to stop their 
injustice, and this would be mentioned during his trial. At this time, the Athenians began 
to perceive Socrates in a new light: his teachings were no longer harmless and he was 
no longer just a local eccentric with questionable values. From this point on, he was 
viewed as a dangerous influence that bred tyrants and threatened the common people.
Following the reestablishment of the democracy in 403 B.C., an official pardon 
prevented Socrates and a great many others from being prosecuted for any of their 
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actions during or before the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. In other words, Socrates would 
have to be charged with criminal activity between the years 403 and 399 B.C., however, 
he would continue his teachings unfalteringly during these years despite pressure to 
cease. He once again found himself at the center  of another anti-democratic revolt in 
401, this one also led by the disgruntled aristocratic youth, who were well-known to 
have flocked to Socrates. The people of Athens had had enough of Socrates and his 
influence over their youth. His close relationship with the traitor Alcibiades and the 
barbarous Critias was suspicious to say the least and his knack for attracting young, 
powerful Athenian aristocrats would have been enough to warrant his execution in 
association with the injustice of the Thirty Tyrants. Despite the general amnesty that was 
issued following the reinstatement of the democracy, Socrates continued to voice his 
anti-egalitarian, pro-oligarchic beliefs with a fervor that was credited for turning 
otherwise peaceful young men into violent Spartan-emulating tyrants.
A famous interpretation of the trial is presented by Aechines about fifty years 
later, indicating that the true cause of Socrates’ execution was his association with the 
Thirty Tyrants. To a jury of Athenians he spoke, “you executed Socrates, the sophist, 
because he was clearly responsible for the education of Critias, one of the thirty anti-
democratic leaders.”  This allusion to Socrates by the orator Aechines is incredibly 22
significant and indicative of the underlying issue of the trial. Aechines wouldn’t have 
made this reference if the reason for the philosopher’s execution was not generally 
accepted to have been his connection to the Tyrants, and the fact that Aechines won his 
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case further demonstrates the potency of this reference. The injustice and brutality of 
the Thirty Tyrants was still fresh in the memory of Athenians and so too was the blemish 
on Socrates’ reputation that resulted from his indisputable influence on Critias, the most 
powerful of the oligarchs. While it is impossible to prove that Socrates was directly 
responsible for the injustices committed against the democracy, an analysis of the 
available information warrants, at least, guilt by association. The incredible irony of the 
trial is that Athens, a city-state in which its citizens enjoyed unparalleled cultural and 
intellectual liberty, sentenced to death their greatest thinker in what is perhaps one of 
the most significant and obvious abridgments of a citizen’s freedom of speech in 
Western history. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates calls himself a “gadfly”, responsible for 
keeping the horse that is the Athenian state from getting lazy by always asking 
questions and seeking justice, but according to journalist I.F. Stone, “it seems his sting 
was not much in evidence when Athens needed it most.”  Perhaps the real guilt of the 23
wisest man in Greece was his inaction in the face of clear injustice. 
Section C - The State as a Moral Teacher
Among the most significant political philosophers to disapprove of the state’s 
involvement in the lives of its citizens is John Stuart Mill. In his book On Liberty, Mill 
applies his utilitarian ethics to the state and to society as a whole. He has his own ideal 
for the relationship between the individual and authority—one in which the state has no 
right to take away the liberty of its citizens in any way. There are several ways that a 
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state can threaten the liberties of its people. One way is to directly impose its will on 
them in such a way that the individual feels as though he cannot make his own 
decisions, or that he is constrained in his action. This way is quite straightforward, but 
Mill believes that a government also threatens its people’s freedom when it uses 
coercion or attempts to influence them against their will. This includes manipulating 
public opinion or indirectly inserting certain beliefs into the minds of the masses. In Mill’s 
most legitimate and ideal state, each individual is free to pursue his own interests and 
do his best to improve his own life. The only restriction on this freedom is that ones 
actions cannot cause harm to others. 
In chapter one, Mill famously posits, “That the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent one from doing harm to others.”  This assertion forms the basis of Mill’s ‘Harm 24
Principle’, which remains the cornerstone of libertarian theory. According to the Harm 
Principle, any action which threatens the integrity of another individual’s complete 
sovereignty is unjustified, even if the best interests of said individual are at the heart of 
the action:
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right... The 
only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely 
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concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.25
The only instances where such actions can be justified are when the the wellbeing of an 
individual is at stake. For example, the state is justified in making laws that keep its 
citizens from killing one another, or perhaps even in punishing those who break such 
laws. That any harmful action between men is unacceptable follows from mankind’s 
most basic instinct: self-preservation. Mill’s understanding of self-preservation is quite 
similar to Rousseau’s, and both men agree that it is an innate and inescapable aspect 
of human nature. Every person has the right to protect themselves, and it is man’s most 
natural liberty.
It would seem that a state aimed at moral education is at odds with the libertarian 
belief that government ought not to interfere in the lives of its citizens. Indeed, it has 
already been established that governments derive their legitimacy only from the people, 
and that the only legitimate governments act solely in accordance with the wills of its 
people. In a just and proper state, the individual is the master of his own fate; he is free 
to make decisions for himself regarding how he wants to live and how he spends his 
time. There are many today who resent any action taken by the government that 
disturbs their lives at all, even if it is for the benefit of the whole. It is essential that 
government not purposely act against the desires of its people or cause harm to them in 
any way. An ideal state reflects the nature of its citizens, and among man’s most natural 
tendencies are pride and compassion. An ideal state is therefore not only proud and 
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compassionate in and of itself, but it aims to further cultivate these virtues within its 
citizens. It is in this way that a government can, and must, work to instill and perfect the 
virtues of pride and compassion without the possibility of conflicting with the wills of its 
people. The only time it is permissible for the state to involve itself in the personal lives 
of its citizens is to promote these most fundamental human values, which in turn 
encourage political activity and improve the state and the lives of its individuals.
Mill’s understanding of man’s most primitive nature, that is, his inherent drive to 
preserve his own life, fails to take both pride and compassion into account. Pride grows 
from the drive for self-preservation. It is what makes people work constantly to improve 
their lives and achieve more, even once they are safe from harm. Compassion is the 
cause for man’s natural aversion to harming others, despite his desire to improve his 
own lot at any cost. These two aspects of human nature are just as deeply embedded 
as liberty and self-preservation in the nature of mankind and ought therefore to play just 
as fundamental a role in a legitimate government. 
It is absolutely crucial that a legitimate government foster pride and compassion 
within its people because without these it is impossible to achieve an ideal democracy. 
The most ideal democracy is one in which the greatest number of citizens is actively 
involved in the affairs of the state. The two forces of pride and compassion inspire and 
condition political action, which is necessary if a state is to accurately and continuously 
reflect the wills of its citizens. Each citizen ought to feel connected to the state as if it 
were something he himself worked tirelessly to create. He ought to feel pride in his state 
for this reason, just like an artist feels pride in his artwork or a doctor feels pride in 
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helping someone. This is not a selfish pride, but rather an appreciation of a job well 
done. In fact, pride in ones state can be characterized as the least selfish action 
achievable, since it inspires action in the service of something greater than any 
individual. Political action is most often aimed at the benefit of the community, and one 
rarely takes such action for the sake of himself.
 Compassion is what tempers his intrinsic drive to please only himself, and 
motivates him to desire the welfare of others. American politics are dominated by a 
perpetual power struggle between two opposing parties, each seeking to undermine the 
other in an attempt to appease their advocates and increase their credibility. Too often 
the success of one party is at the expense of the other, and it seems that each decision 
made in favor of one is taking something from the other. Indeed, the success of one 
party is often described in terms of its curtailing of the other’s agenda; one cannot thrive 
while the other does not suffer. A dominant percentage of Americans align themselves 
with one political party and will never stray from it. Polls over the last several 
presidencies have shown that the majority of citizens will vote for their party’s candidate 
regardless of who that candidate is or what they represent, and without considering the 
other party’s candidate whatsoever. The problem is, of course, a fundamental one 
rooted deeply in party politics, but one can imagine that in a world where one’s interests 
extend beyond his own personal wellbeing to include the wellbeing of neighbors and 
distant countrymen alike, one might be more likely to make political decisions based on 
something more than party allegiance. With the proper manifestations of pride and 
compassion, one should feel personal fulfillment in the flourishing of his state. In this 
way, the interests of the state and the interests of the individual are aligned.
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In response to Mill’s assertion that a government has no right to threaten the 
sovereignty of the individual, or to interfere in the lives of its people, I posit that pride 
and compassion are fundamental to achieving true sovereignty. Pride and compassion 
are necessary for political action, which is the means by which one affirms his 
sovereignty and protects his liberty. In this sense, the cultivation of pride and 
compassion by the state is principally responsible for both sovereignty and liberty, and 
any state that does not work to instill these values in its citizens is keeping them from 
achieving the highest, most valuable form of free political action.
Section D: Nationalism and Compassionate Politics
Though the proper cultivation of pride and compassion within a citizen should 
result in a strong sense of nationalism, it is important to distinguish this well-founded 
attachment to ones state from the harmful manifestation of national pride that results in 
bigotry and xenophobia. Nationalist sentiment is most often built upon feelings of pride 
that one develops for his own people. This pride, though, frequently involves more than 
just love for ones country. History has shown that nationalist sentiment often 
corresponds directly with xenophobia, or hatred of foreigners. In other words, the more 
someone loves their country, the less they like people of different nationalities. It has 
also been shown that levels of nationalism and xenophobia both decrease with 
increases in education.  That is to say, the more educated people are, the less likely 26
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they are to express nationalist sentiment and the less likely they are to express feelings 
of xenophobia. This leads to the somewhat unfair conclusion that intelligent people are, 
in general, less bigoted and less attached to their state than unintelligent people, who 
are more hateful and ignorantly nationalistic. Both xenophobia and nationalism, though, 
should be considered entirely separate from intelligence. The former is the result of a 
misled sense of pride and a lack of true compassion, and the latter is the result of a 
properly developed sense of pride that is conditioned by compassion. 
The two sides of nationalism, the constructive and the destructive, can be seen 
even in short periods of history. The birth of German nationalism in the 19th century 
demonstrates well the power of national pride paired with compassion. At a time when 
Germany was merely a collection of independent states, enlightenment philosopher 
Johann Gottfried Herder created a concept of German nationalism based on collective 
self determination and cultural identity. His concept echoed many of the naturalistic 
sentiments of Rousseau, and asserted that the German nation derives its legitimacy 
from the shared language and culture of its people. In his Addresses to the German 
Nation, Johann Gottlieb Fichte posited:
Just as it is true beyond doubt that, wherever a separate language 
is found, there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take 
independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself.27
The German people shared an identity and they were drawn to one another naturally.
This nationalist movement would endure the Napoleonic Wars before eventually 
achieving tentative unification in 1848 and forming a national spirit based on equal 
 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, Reginald Foy Jones, and George Henry. Turnbull. Addresses to the German 27
Nation. Chicago: Open court Pub. Co., 1922. 215.
 Cree  38
representation, popular sovereignty, and most importantly, inclusion. In this instance, as 
well as in the example of 5th century Athens, the positive force of a healthy sense of 
nationalism is evident.
The negative manifestation of nationalism—one lacking in compassion—can be 
seen in Germany just a few short years later. The emergence of the German Empire in 
1871 marked a fundamental shift in the way national identity was conceived of. What 
was once a government based on liberal, egalitarian values quickly became 
authoritarian in nature, as the goal of the newly formed nation changed from unification 
to asserting political, military, and cultural dominance on its citizens and its neighbors. 
German nationalism no longer served to inspire pride and compassion within its people, 
but instead indoctrinated its people with racism and social Darwinism. These sentiments 
would remain pervasive in Germany politics throughout the First and Second World 
Wars, during which Germany would be motivated by naked aggression and unchecked 
pride to commit heinous crimes against their enemies. 
Though every human has the innate capacity for compassion, the type of 
compassion necessary to counter the potential destructiveness of national pride is not 
easy to cultivate. As is discussed earlier, it takes a degree of maturity and habituation in 
order for ones compassion to truly extend beyond his own countrymen, let alone his 
own peers. Compassion is rooted in a shared identity, and it can be quite difficult for 
someone to feel a shared identity with someone from a different culture. But even 
people of different culture, color, or language are united in the most important and 
fundamental way: they are all member of the human race and can therefore empathize 
with one another profoundly. Though not every human being is able to recognize this 
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shared global identity, it is much stronger than it may seem. During wartime, it is 
common practice to develop racist or dehumanizing attitudes toward ones enemies as a 
way of justifying or necessitating violence towards them. Reducing ones enemies to a 
subhuman level makes it easier for one to fight his compassionate nature, since it 
severs their shared identity and makes it more difficult to empathize. But to do harm to 
another human being is a betrayal of man’s most intrinsic nature. It is the capacity for 
universal compassion that keeps pride in ones state from becoming a motivator for 
violence. The ideal citizen has pride in the flourishing of his state in addition to a keen 
sense of compassion for his fellow human beings. 
This is Rousseau’s concept of pity expanded beyond the individual to include the 
affairs of the state. His maxim for life within the State of Nature, “do what is good for you 
with as little harm as possible to others”, can be understood in a much broader sense 
than Rousseau entails. If violence between people in the State of Nature is 
discouraged, if not avoided entirely, by their innate repulsion to causing harm to one 
another, then why can’t this same drive also characterize international politics? Global 
interactions are largely governed by the same laws as the State of Nature, in the sense 
that there are no laws, nor a central government, to keep the peace. Order is 
maintained between nations by necessity. Although there have been times when this 
order has been lost, it is found again when man’s natural compassion is allowed to take 
over. Compassion is what keeps international disputes from turning violent, and what 
encourages nations to work together to solve world problems instead of constantly 
waging war against one another. Just as in the State of Nature, the international players 
 Cree  40
always seek to protect themselves and improve their own positions, but rarely does this 
drive take the form of physical violence.
An ideal state is one governed by the principles of pride and compassion, which 
are the two drives most fundamental to human nature. It is comprised of citizens that 
feel a deep sense of pride in the flourishing of their state and for the role they play in its 
operation. But despite their desire to improve it as much as they are able, they will 
always stop short of causing harm to other states. They will also respect the pride 
others feel for their states because they understand the connection that exists between 
citizen and state if the latter is legitimate. 
Part Three
Section A: Citizen/State as Parent/Child
The relationship that one has with his state both guides his political action and 
grows from it. That one feels a connection to his countrymen and for his state should 
not be taken for granted, though. For example, a citizen of one state might find it easier 
to identify with the policies of another state if his appears to not reflect his values or 
beliefs. This is the fault of both the individual and his state. Just as a citizen has the 
responsibility to actively participate in the operation of his state through engaging in 
political action, the state has an obligation to foster the relationship between itself and 
its citizens. In an ideal state, a citizen will neither shy away from political action nor 
divorce himself from his national identity should his government make a decision he 
cannot support. Instead, his resolve in strengthened and his desire to engage in political 
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life is renewed. Just as each citizen is a child of the state, so too is the state a creation 
of its citizens—an amalgamation of their wills. 
The necessary relationship between citizen and state is similar to the relationship 
between parent and child. A child is a reflection of his parents in some way, just as the 
state is a reflection of its citizens. But every parent wants his child to be somehow better 
than him, so he tries to pass down only his most positive and desirable traits. This is the 
same for a state, which models itself after a set of ideals that transcend the individual 
citizen. Although human beings are imperfect in nature, they must believe that through 
combined effort they can create a state that encompasses all of their best features, and 
as few of their negative ones as possible. Most importantly, a parent never gives up on 
his child. No matter what the child has done, a parent is never free of his parental 
responsibility. To abandon ones state just because it is not, at that moment, reflective of 
ones interests is to abandon his responsibility to his country and his countrymen. One 
must instead act as a parent would: he must do whatever is in his power to cause the 
change he wishes to see. Disappointment must be met with resiliency.
Section B: Beerbohm on Complicity
In his book In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, Eric Beerbohm of Harvard 
University discusses the complex relationship between citizen and state in a 
representative democracy. Though a representative democracy is less ideal than a 
direct one, the responsibilities of citizenship are the same. To him, the democratic 
citizen is bound to the state at birth, even though he doesn’t necessarily choose to be
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—“All of us were born into a political structure that we did not preselect.”  Just because 28
one doesn’t chose which state he is born into doesn’t mean he can simply disavow his 
citizenship. Not every responsibility is volunteered for or agreed to, some are just 
inherent. Take morality for example. There are certain moral responsibilities the 
individual has when it comes to interacting with others that are unspoken, unenforced, 
and may be difficult to carry out. For instance, someone is obligated to report a crime or 
prevent injustices from being committed. If that person were to neglect those 
responsibilities simply by claiming that he didn’t consent to take them on, he would no 
doubt still be wrong, if not complicit in the crime for doing nothing to stop it. 
This idea of moral complicity is central to Beerbohm’s piece. The question posed 
in the book’s short back-cover synopsis is, “When a government in a democracy acts in 
our name, are we, as citizens, responsible for those acts?” And his answer is simple: 
yes. Early on, he makes the assertion: “there are responsibilities of the democratic 
citizen that are nondelegable… I take complicity to be the professional hazard of 
democratic citizenship.”  That is to say, accountability on the part of the individual 29
citizen for the acts of his state is implicit within a democratic system. His explanation is 
that since citizens in a democracy are causally bound to political outcomes, whether 
they actively contribute to them or not, they bear responsibility for both the just and the 
unjust actions of their state. 
It may seem like a stretch in a representative democracy to consider voters 
legitimate agents because of how far removed they are from the actual decision-making 
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process, but Beerbohm reasons that when voters elect individuals to represent their 
interests, they become morally liable for the actions those individuals take in their name. 
He posits, “Because our primary mode of political agency is mediated, we are 
vulnerable to the charge of participating in the wrongdoing of another.”  But are 30
individuals who voted against a specific candidate still guilty when that candidate takes 
office and goes on to commit injustice? Beerbohm says yes. He rationalizes this on the 
basis of association and mutual benefit. As supporters and recipients of the state, each 
and every citizen shares the burden of accountability for its actions. Complicity is 
completely unavoidable, and he is right to point this out. 
 Though it may not sound fair, it is rationally sound. However, the fact that a 
representative could possibly misrepresent the interests of his constituents points to the 
fundamental flaw of representative democracy: ones will cannot be delegated. It’s been 
said before that the only adequate representation and self-representation and this is 
essential if the individual is to maintain his freedom and sovereignty. The disadvantages 
of representative democracy will be discussed further shortly, but for now it must suffice 
since it is the closest thing to an ideal government that exists today.
On the assumption that responsibility for the injustices of ones state is inevitable, 
one must do whatever is in his power to counteract these injustices. The principle cause 
of injustice is a lack of compassion. Without compassion, nothing is to stop a state from 
committing ethical crimes against another in order to advance its own agenda. 
Compassion must prevail because it is in man’s nature for it to. But in order for it to be 
able to, each citizen must fulfill his responsibility to his state and to his countrymen by 
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engaging in the political realm. To simply remove oneself from politics in the hopes of 
disassociating from the wrong-doers is morally impossible. This is like the example of a 
person witnessing a crime and doing nothing. Of course he is not actively participating 
in the crime, but he is at the very least an accessory to it. 
Section C: The “Moral Voter Complex” and Deliberation
Standing in the way of political engagement is what Beerbohm calls the “Moral 
Voter Complex”, which appears to be a struggle between morality and rationality within 
the voting individual. In a democratic system, the effect that one person can have on the 
outcome of a major decision is minuscule. When the typical citizen comes to realize this 
fact, he may be dissuaded from voting, or worse, disillusioned with the democratic 
system entirely. It seems that the individual is helpless in the face of injustice. 
Beerbohm explains:
Once prudential citizens recognize that their ballot will be 
ineffectual, they will decide not only that participating in the polls 
flies in the face of rationality. Expending any epistemic effort into 
their vote is equally pointless. For it is nearly certain that any 
mental energy and time they invest will have no payoff. They lack 
incentives to lead an active mental life about politics, save the small 
minority who share an aesthetic appreciation for the topic.31
It may be rational for one to conclude that his vote will have no significant effect on the 
result of an election or the trajectory of his state’s policies, but this does not mean it is 
acceptable to abandon the political system to which he belongs. Rationality alone will 
not provide the incentive necessary for meaningful political engagement, which does not 
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entail only voting occasionally for representatives in local or national elections. There is 
a moral component to democratic participation that is fundamental to the proper 
functioning of any legitimate state. 
This moral component is ultimately what must prevail over rationality in 
Beerbohm’s view. He begins his line of inquiry by asking, “Do citizens have moral 
reason to aim to reform unjust institutions, given their diminishing chances of playing a 
decisive role?”  This question of morality gets to the heart of the voter’s inner conflict. 32
On the one hand, the voter recognizes that his power to independently enact change on 
the scale that he wishes to is insignificant. On the other hand though, he has an ethical 
responsibility to fight injustice that he perceives in the actions of his state. Since each is 
essentially guilty by association, “citizens have reason to reduce their “complicity 
footprint” through more active participation.”  What this means is to take active 33
measures to try and neutralize the injustices committed by the state in the name of its 
citizens. Political activism, increases in voter turnout, and mediums of social and 
political dialogue are all demonstrations of the type of response to institutional wrong-
doing that Beerbohm wishes to see.34
The “Moral Voter Complex” requires that one transcend his rational response—
that the act of voting, when taken individually, is almost entirely inconsequential—and 
act from a place of moral necessity. But what morals is Beerbohm most concerned with? 
The Aristotelian virtues of wisdom, temperance, and justice? Does he mean the 
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contemporary liberal virtues of egalitarianism and human rights? Is there an inherent 
moral standard, separate from either of these doctrines that he believes every 
democratic citizen should maintain? The answer is complicated. Beerbohm accepts that 
the typical citizen has many responsibilities outside of his political ones, and as a result, 
he cannot be reasonably expected to dedicate the same amount of time to political 
deliberation (a concept emphasized by many political theorists) as a career politician, 
for instance. This means that, from his view, citizens need not have a comprehensive 
understanding of ethics or political doctrine. Most of the work that needs to be done by 
the democratic citizen is described as “cognitive”.
 Though his standard for deliberation is markedly lower than political theorists 
typically advocate, the process of deliberation is still crucial to proper political 
engagement. And while this deliberation does not depend on lofty or hyper-rational 
virtues, it does still depend on a couple more accessible ones. These are justice and the 
common good. He asserts, “All members of a democracy have cognitive responsibilities
—moral obligations to form and manage their convictions about justice and the common 
good.”  ‘Common good’, in particular, is a quite vague idea, but this is the way 35
Beerbohm intends it to be. Justice, too, is a concept that can be taken in many ways. 
The broad spectrum on which different people may choose to position 
themselves in relation to these two values is indicative of the plurality of perspectives 
necessitated by Beerbohm’s unique concept of deliberation. To him, deliberation is an 
innately interactive process that depends on a variety of inputs in order to create a more 
inclusive dialogue about political issues. One cannot simply deliberate by himself in the 
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privacy of his home. It must be done publicly where others can listen and respond, and 
each person must be willing to have their minds changed. Justice and common good 
mean something different to everyone, and thus they are accessible to everyone, even 
those without political or philosophical expertise. By leveling the political playing field, so 
to speak, each citizen is free to exercise their own unique voice and secure their agency 
and sovereignty. 
Justice and common good are communally oriented values. The former deals 
with relations between individuals or groups of people in terms of right and wrong and 
the latter aims at communal benefit. Though Beerbohm does not discuss it in these 
terms, both seem to be closely related to the idea of compassion. Compassion, as has 
been stated repeatedly, is what naturally inclines human beings toward one another in a 
peaceful and fair fashion. The Rousseauan maxim grows from a desire for the common 
good and implicitly calls for justice in interpersonal endeavors. Beerbohm’s deliberating 
voter is quite similar to the proud and compassionate political actor discussed 
previously in that the goal of each’s actions within the political realm is the same. Ethical 
responsibility takes the place of pride and compassion in motivating and conditioning 
political action. That said, there are a few significant differences between the connection 
the proud and compassionate political actor has with the state and the connection the 
morally obligated voter has with it. 
Section D: Selective Citizenship and the Faults of Representative Democracy
Beerbohm’s account of complicity and moral responsibility paints a clear and 
effective picture of what it means to be a citizen in a democracy, but this picture is 
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incomplete. Much has been said about bearing responsibility for, and responding to, 
injustices by the state, but little has been said about how the relationship between 
citizen and state is actually characterized. 
To begin, Beerbohm has the individual citizen caring for the state only when it is 
in peril. While he accepts that there are those who will always involve themselves in 
politics out of personal interest, he denies that citizens have a responsibility to engage 
continuously in politics, “There is, I think, little reason to think that our participatory 
obligations are constant… It is mistaken to claim that we have a moral duty to vote—full 
stop.”  The morally responsible voter responds to actions by the state that he finds 36
disagreeable, but otherwise withholds his input. Political engagement in these terms 
essentially takes the form of damage control. One chooses to take political action 
because he feels his will is being misrepresented and he wishes to set the record 
straight. This response might seem commendable because it is a productive one that 
re-engages him with his state, as opposed to turning his back on it and pleading 
innocence for its wrongdoings. But this is still an inherently selfish act, motivated more 
by a fear of complicity than by any real obligation to the state. 
Where is the pride? Where is the compassion? There is no pride, except perhaps 
pride in oneself for making what he perceives to be an upstanding decision in the face 
of injustice. There is no compassion, because what motivates his action is not genuine 
care for others or for his community, but a refusal to be seen as having a lower moral 
standard than he thinks he has. This rationale, and the way Beerbohm discusses the 
citizen’s obligations, serve to divorce the citizen from the state in a way that they 
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shouldn't be. He depicts them as two separate entities that engage with one another 
mostly just when they are at odds. Instead of political action being motivated by 
occasional shame, it should be an unceasing commitment to mold the state into a voice 
for its people. The will of the state should be indistinguishable from the will of its 
citizens, because through proper and consistent political action the state becomes a 
medium for self-identity, not something for identities to be compared against. 
 Political involvement must be continuous if the state is to fulfill the role it was 
created for, and that is to be a constantly evolving expression of its citizens’ will and 
character. In his Social Contract, Rousseau describes the individual as an “indivisible 
part of the whole.”  The most essential aspect of the implicit agreement made between 37
people upon entering into civil society is that this society be an honest and consistent 
reflection of its people—all of them. Unwillingness to participate in the political life of the 
state must be seen as a disservice to oneself and to ones fellow citizens. Every citizen 
plays an irreplaceable role in creating the nature of the state, which in turn helps to 
define each of its citizens. Political action is the vehicle of ones sovereignty, and without 
a political voice, one simply consents to be ruled. This would not have been sufficient to 
abandon the State of Nature for. 
This criticism of Beerbohm is most likely rooted in the fact that his doctrine is 
based on a system of representative democracy and not a direct one. Representative 
government entails a degree of alienation between citizen and state because of the 
individual’s inability to engage directly with the decision-making process. Forced to act 
through mediators, it is impossible for citizens to feel a personal stake in the state and 
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the actions it takes. This personal stake can only be developed through meaningful 
interaction. It comes when the individual feels a sense of ownership for his state 
because of the role he played in making it what it is, like the way a business owner feels 
in growing his business from the ground up or the way a sculptor feels in finishing a 
piece. This sense of ownership and belonging leads to the development of pride for 
ones state. This pride binds the citizen to the state, in such a way that he could never 
leave its governance in the hands of another. The removal of delegations would not 
suddenly make everyone’s vote count for more, but it would increase accountability and 
decrease complicity among citizens.
Section E: Sovereignty, Agency, and Personal Stake
Representative governments are unable to meaningfully represent the wills of 
their citizens. It is impossible even for those in elected positions to do this, and it is 
through no fault of their own. This is because no one person can know or adequately 
express the wills of many, because each is a conditioned by a unique identity with a 
personal connection to the state and his peers. Even in the case of consensus, the wills 
of each citizen cannot be delegated. It is through political involvement, through the 
democratic process, that a citizen lays claim to his agency and individuality. It is how he 
stakes his claim to his state, making it his. Someone could go through their entire life 
living within a country and never form such a profound connection because he was 
never able to engage with his state meaningfully and without restraint. He was never 
made to experience his political agency and sovereignty, and as a result he is inclined 
to think of the state as something that controls him or inhibits his free will. 
 Cree  51
If one does not partake in the political life of his state, no matter the system of 
government, he might as well be living under a monarch or dictator. If anyone other than 
himself makes decisions on his behalf, he is not free. Freedom entails more than just 
freedom to act however one chooses. One must also be free of things that may 
influence his thought or his actions. Mill was the first to posit that freedom must also 
mean the absence of coercion, arguing that coercion by the masses toward the 
individual is only permissible in the event that said individual is a clearly perceivable 
threat to others. Even in the rare circumstance of a true consensus of the people, it is 
not justified for them to express or impose their beliefs in such a way that it influences 
others. He explains:
Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one 
with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion 
unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I 
deny the right of people to exercise such coercion, either by 
themselves or by their government. This power is illegitimate… If all 
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person 
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in 
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be 
justified in silencing mankind.38
Mill is right, of course, in maintaining that the masses have no more right to speak for 
the individual as the individual has to speak for the masses. One might attempt to justify 
exclusion from political life by affirming that freedom of action also allows for inaction. 
While this is the case in nearly every scenario, it cannot be the case when it comes to 
exercising ones vote or political voice. Without these, the individual puts himself at the 
mercy of his peers, who are unlikely to try to do him harm, but will coerce him toward 
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actions that he may not have chosen for himself. In any case, he submits himself to live 
in a society that he has no hand in shaping and no voice of his own. 
That one consent, either tacitly or otherwise, to live within a state is completely 
insufficient in ensuring its legitimacy. It is irrational to claim, as Hobbes does, that 
people ought to submit to rule by others as a way of ensuring their survival. It is in 
man’s most basic nature to experience freedom and self-determination as he would in 
the State of Nature, where the only natural law governing him is compassion. On the 
assumption that the State of Nature is not violent and deplorable, one must actually 
have an incentive to abandon it in favor of civil society. People can only be expected to 
consent to a society in which both their liberty and sovereignty remain intact. But, ironic 
as it may sound, these two things can only be protected through consistent and willful 
political action. It is through political action that one self-represents and exercises his 
sovereignty. Personal liberty, too, is at risk when one refuses to engage in political life 
because to not do so is to consent to the will of others. Locke describes liberty within 
the state as follows:
In political society, liberty consists of being under no other 
lawmaking power except that established by consent in the 
commonwealth. People are free from the dominion of any will or 
legal restraint apart from that enacted by their own constituted 
lawmaking power according to the trust put in it.39
This definition, though not intended for a direct democracy, represents the relationship 
between the citizen and the ideal state. The individual should at no point be under the 
power of a law that he did not have a hand in creating. This would essentially be like 
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consenting to a foreign legislature, since he was uninvolved in the decision-making 
process and the law is not reflective of his nature. What Locke calls the commonwealth 
should instead be considered the amalgamation of each citizens’ will, which each 
enacts continuously alongside his fellow citizens. The law should never feel like an 
imposition, it should feel like an agreement, and if ever it doesn’t feel this way, then it is 
unjust. 
Conclusion
Since society is formed by the consent of the people, its authority should rest in 
their hands. The state ought to be established with mankind’s natural tendencies in 
mind if it is to legitimately represent its citizens. Since the most fundamental tendencies 
among them are pride and compassion, then the state must harness these to their 
greatest potential. If the state is not organized according to man’s nature, then it will 
inspire resentment and limit the degree to which citizens can connect with their state. 
The state should not be seen as something that imposes itself on its citizens or controls 
them from afar, it should be seen as an extension of its citizens that grows and evolves 
alongside them. This cannot occur by way of delegation; each citizen must engage 
directly with the decision-making process. Pride is what inspires political activity, 
because if one feels pride for something, he will do his best to sustain and improve it. In 
an ideal state, each citizen feels a personal connection to the state and experiences 
pride in its flourishing, the same way a gardener feels pride in watching his garden 
grow. Just like the gardener, the citizen will want to make his state as good as it can 
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possibly be. Compassion, on the other hand, must not only be considered the origin of 
society, since it is what naturally inclines people toward one another peacefully, but also 
the force that guides political activity and keeps pride from becoming destructive. 
In an era when Americans feel increasingly alienated from the state, it is more 
important than ever that political engagement take place. It seems strange that in an 
age of unparalleled independence and individualism, people are content to let decisions 
be made for them. The problem is one of identity. The identity of the individual does not 
align with the perceived identity of the state—they represent different things. But this 
does not need to be the case. Representative democracy is far from ideal, but even 
within the American system there exist avenues for citizens to engage directly with the 
political process. It is incumbent on each American to use whatever means are at their 
disposal to cause the change they wish to see, whether this be voting, protesting, or 
petitioning. Of these, the latter two require no mediation. It is only through this kind of 
activity that the modern citizen can build a healthy and meaningful relationship to the 
state. If national pride is not enough to promote political engagement, then compassion 
for others should be. It is time for every individual to be made accountable. To 
disengage oneself from his country is irrational and morally unacceptable, but it speaks 
to a failure on the part of both the citizen and the state. It is the citizen’s role to 
contribute to the identity of the state, but it is equally important that the state provide the 
means by which its citizens can do this. 
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